Afghanistan cables: The Contras, Cocaine, and Covert Operations
Deputy Secretary Armitage = a main important criminal in the drug buseness and in the Iran contra Affäre.
September 11, 2011
Secret U.S. Message to Mullah Omar: „Every Pillar of the Taliban Regime Will Be Destroyed“
New Documents Detail America’s Strategic Response to 9/11
Read the Documents
Document 1 – Action Plan
U.S. Department of State, Memorandum,“ Action Plan as of 9/13/2001 7:55:51am,“ September 13, 2001, Secret, 3 pp. [Excised]
Two days after the 9/11 attacks, the Department of State creates an action plan to document U.S. government activities taken so far and to create an immediate list of things to do. Included in the list are high-level meetings with Pakistani officials, including ISI intelligence Director Mahmoud Ahmed. [Note that Ahmed’s September 13 meeting with Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage is detailed in Document 3 and Document 5.] The action plan details efforts to get international support, including specific U.S. diplomatic approaches to Russia, Saudi Arabia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Georgia, Sudan, China and Indonesia.
Document 2 – Islamabad 05087
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, „Musharraf: We Are With You in Your Action Plan in Afghanistan“ September 13, 2001, Secret – Noforn, 7 pp. [Excised]
Newly appointed U.S. Ambassador Wendy Chamberlin „bluntly“ tells Pakistani President Musharraf „that the September 11 attacks had changed the fundamentals of the [Afghanistan – Pakistan] debate. There was absolutely no inclination in Washington to enter into a dialogue with the Taliban. The time for dialog was finished as of September 11.“ Effectively declaring the Taliban a U.S. enemy (along with al-Qaeda), Ambassador Chamberlin informs President Musharraf „that the Taliban are harboring the terrorists responsible for the September 11 attacks. President Bush was, in fact, referring to the Taliban in his speech promising to go after those who harbored terrorists.“ [Note: A less complete version of this document was previously released and posted on September 13, 2010. This copy has less information withheld.]
Document 3 – State 157813 [Version 1]
Document 3 – State 157813 [Version 2]
U.S. Department of State, Cable, „Deputy Secretary Armitage’s Meeting with Pakistan Intel Chief Mahmud: You’re Either With Us or You’re Not,“ September 13, 2001, Secret, 9 pp. [Excised]
The day after the 9/11 attacks, Deputy Secretary Armitage meets with Pakistani Intelligence (ISI) Chief Mahmoud Ahmed (which can also be spelled Mehmood Ahmad, Mahmud or Mahmoud). Armitage presents a „stark choice“ in the 15-minute meeting. „Pakistan must either stand with the United States in its fight against terrorism or stand against us. There was no maneuvering room.“ Mahmud assures Armitage that the U.S. „could count on Pakistan’s ‘unqualified support,‘ that Islamabad would do whatever was required of it by the U.S.“ Deputy Secretary Armitage adamantly denies Pakistan has the option of a middle road between supporting the Taliban and the U.S., „this was a black-and-white choice, with no grey.“ Mahmoud responds by commenting „that Pakistan has always seen such matters in black-and-white. It has in the past been accused of ‘being-in-bed‘ with those threatening U.S. interests. He wanted to dispel that misconception.“ Mahmoud’s denial of longstanding historical Pakistani support for extremists in Afghanistan directly conflicts with U.S. intelligence on the issue, which has documented extensive Pakistani support for the Taliban and multiple other militant organizations.
Advocate“ (Elizabeth Cheney, the Vice President’s daughter) and „Ace“ (Philip J. Perry, the Vice President’s son-in-law).
Document 23 – Snowflake
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Snowflake Memorandum, From Donald Rumsfeld to Doug Feith, „Afghanistan,“ April 17, 2002, 9:15AM, Secret, 1 p. [Excised]
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld is concerned the U.S. does not yet have comprehensive plans for U.S. activities in Afghanistan. „I may be impatient. In fact I know I’m a bit impatient. But the fact that Iran and Russia have plans for Afghanistan and we don’t concerns me.“ The Secretary laments the state of interagency coordination and is alarmed that bureaucratic delay may harm the war effort. „We are never going to get the U.S. military out of Afghanistan unless we take care to see that there is something going on that will provide the stability that will be necessary for us to leave.“
Document 24 – Memorandum
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Memorandum, From Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, „Al Qaeda Ops Sec,“ July 19, 2002, Secret, 1 p. [Excised]
U.S. officials are unsure whether or not Osama bin Laden is alive, with the intelligence community assessing that he must be because „his death would be too important a fact for [members of al-Qaeda] to be able to keep it a secret.“ Paul Wolfowitz rejects this assertion, arguing that bin Laden’s survival is equally important news for al-Qaeda to communicate, leading him to conclude that the terrorists are „able to communicate quite effectively on important subjects without our detecting anything.“ Although specifics remain classified, the memo expresses concern over America’s overreliance on a specific capability allowing the U.S. to track terrorist organizations. Wolfowitz questions whether or not this technique is providing a false sense of security to intelligence officials and that the U.S. may even be being manipulated by terrorists who may know about U.S. capabilities. „We are a bit like the drunk looking for our keys under the lamppost because that is the only place where there is light.“ Critical information may be in places the U.S. is not looking.
Document 25 – Kabul 000509
U.S. Embassy (Kabul), Cable, „Afghan Supplemental“ February 6, 2006, Secret, 3 pp. [Excised]
In a message to the Secretary of State, U.S. Ambassador Ronald R. Neumann expresses his concern that the American failure to fully fund and support activities designed to bolster the Afghan economy, infrastructure and reconstruction effort is harming the American mission. His letter is a plea for additional money and a shift in priorities. „We have dared so greatly, and spent so much in blood and money that to try to skimp on what is needed for victory seems to me too risky.“
The Ambassador notes, „the supplemental decision recommendation to minimize economic assistance and leave out infrastructure plays into the Taliban strategy, not to ours.“ Taliban leaders were issuing statements that the U.S. would grow increasingly weary, while they gained momentum. A resurgent Taliban leadership ominously summarizes the emerging strategic match-up with the United States by saying, „You have all the clocks but we have all the time.“
Document 26 – Kabul 003863
U.S. Embassy (Kabul), Cable, „Afghanistan: Where We Stand and What We Need“ August 29, 2006, Secret, 8 pp. [Excised]
According to U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Ronald R. Neumann „we are not winning in Afghanistan; although we are far from losing.“ The primary problem is a lack of political will to provide additional resources to bolster current strategy and to match increasing Taliban offensives. „At the present level of resources we can make incremental progress in some parts of the country, cannot be certain of victory, and could face serious slippage if the desperate popular quest for security continues to generate Afghan support for the Taliban…. Our margin for victory in a complex environment is shrinking, and we need to act now.“ The Taliban believe they are winning. That perception „scares the hell out of Afghans.“ „We are too slow.“
Rapidly increasing certain strategic initiatives such as equipping Afghan forces, taking out the Taliban leadership in Pakistan and investing heavily in infrastructure can help the Americans regain the upper hand, Neumann declares. „We can still win. We are pursuing the right general policies on governance, security and development. But because we have not adjusted resources to the pace of the increased Taliban offensive and loss of internal Afghan support we face escalating risks today.“
Halliburton Corporation’s Brown and Root is one of the major components of
Michael C. Ruppert
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The Contras, Cocaine,
and Covert Operations
|An August, 1996, series in the San Jose Mercury News by reporter Gary Webb linked the origins of crack cocaine in California to the contras, a guerrilla force backed by the Reagan administration that attacked Nicaragua’s Sandinista government during the 1980s. Webb’s series, „The Dark Alliance,“ has been the subject of intense media debate, and has focused attention on a foreign policy drug scandal that leaves many questions unanswered.This electronic briefing book is compiled from declassified documents obtained by the National Security Archive, including the notebooks kept by NSC aide and Iran-contra figure Oliver North, electronic mail messages written by high-ranking Reagan administration officials, memos detailing the contra war effort, and FBI and DEA reports. The documents demonstrate official knowledge of drug operations, and collaboration with and protection of known drug traffickers. Court and hearing transcripts are also included.
Special thanks to the Arca Foundation, the Ruth Mott Fund, the Samuel Rubin Foundation, and the Fund for Constitutional Government for their support.
Veröffentlicht am 10.07.2013
During the last two days, I spoke with „dead“ Chip Tatum, the long time CIA figure believed murdered years ago.
Tatum had been involved in assassinations for the U.S. Government and was tasked with killing a presidential third party candidate Ross Perot, a job he refused.
Tatum asked that his new status „among the living“ be announced on Veterans Today, perhaps to help him remain among the living.
FROM THE DEAD
Now, Tatum is back to life, speaking out and spilling his guts on drug running, mortgage fraud and Bush/Ollie North era frauds.
In 1995 Gene Chip Tatum came to me through and mutual friend, Iran-Contra Whistleblower Al Martin to help promote Gene’s story on numerous talk radio programs that I had been on as a guest on.
Gene and I did many of programs as guests. In some cases the talk show hosts did not know what to ask Gene and allowed me to do the interviews, the above in just one of hundreds I saved and may even post to my website when I can get to those buried hidden tapes.
Gene delivered Cocaine to then Governor of Arkansas Bill Clinton for his personal use at the orders of Vice President George HW Bush and worked in the George HW Bush Shadow Government „Operation Black Eagle“ also known as Iran-Contra directly answering to Col. Oliver North and Money Laundered to this reporters ex-in-law Leonard Millman and his Denver, Colorado partners-„Buffer“ Larry Mizel of MDC Holding, Inc a publicly traded company on the NYSE which was the parent company of Silverado Savings and Loan were Neil Bush the President’s son served on the Board of Directors as the CIA’s Narcotics Money Laundering operation. Gene’s Military career began in Vietnam with „Operation Red Rock“ bringing Cambodian into the Vietnam War.
Yes I have recently communicated with Gene Tatum and he does not want to do any interviews at this time