Startseite > Geo Politik > ISSA’s Libya Policy Group (LPG) has hundreds of reports on the Libyan political and security issues, and WMD research programs

ISSA’s Libya Policy Group (LPG) has hundreds of reports on the Libyan political and security issues, and WMD research programs

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Special Reports

 

ISSA’s Libya Policy Group (LPG) has hundreds of reports on the Libyan political and security issues, and WMD research programs, prepared over the past decade. A selection of these will appear on this site. Please check regularly for the addition of important archival reports and new studie

March 25, 2011: Obama Approach to Libya Polarizes NATO, and Further Pushes Turkey into the anti-US Camp/Albania Government Selling Weapons to Qadhafi/Libya’s Tribal Complexity Drives the 2011 Civil War

March 21, 2011: Wider Strategic Factors Emerge as UN-backed “No-Fly Zone” Begins to Take Effect in Libya

February 25, 2011: The Mediterranean, Africa, and the Middle East, Post-Qadhafi: Awakening to a Diverse Landscape, Unimagined in the West

February 23, 2011: Musings of an Heretic: Where the Middle East is Going, and Why the West Fails to Grasp the Many Realities

February 3, 2011: Libya’s Qadhafi Moves Toward Transition, Avoiding Succession Problems, and Resisting Radical Islamists

January 30, 2004: Iraqi WMD Debate and Intelligence Failed to View Total Picture: the Libya Links
January 30, 2004:
Qadhafi’s Health Deteriorates as Opposition Mounts
January 26, 2004:
New Evidence of Ongoing Qadhafi Involvement in Terrorism, Support for Sudanese Rebels
January 22, 2004:
Qadhafi “Rear Guard” Action Attempts to Halt US Discovery of WMD Link With Iraq
December 23, 2003:
Evidence of Libyan Involvement in Mauritania Coup Attempt Highlights Qadhafi’s Strategic Direction
December 22, 2003:
Libyan WMD Programs, Long Cited by GIS, Admitted as Qadhafi Begins Rear-Guard Action to Stave Off US Attack
December 17, 2003:
Libya’s Saif al-Islam Moves Further Away From Reconciliation With US, EU
December 10, 2003:
Qadhafi Seen as Listless at Tunis Summit
December 4, 2003:
New Evidence Illustrates Libyan Leadership Preparing for Qadhafi’s Death
September 5, 2003:
Qadhafi Denies Responsibility for Lockerbie; Calls US Leaders “Prostitutes” and Privately Alleges He Has Bribed Key US Officials to Achieve Closure on Case
September 4, 2003:
Libya, Iran, DPRK Discuss New Strategic Missile Procurement
July 29, 2003:
Niger-Iraq Uranium Reports Involve Ongoing Libyan Deception Ops 
March 12, 2003: Libya Grasps at “Normalization” of Relations With US, UK as Saudi Arabia Reverses Relations With Tripoli
March 3, 2003:
Outburst by Crown Prince ‘Abdullah Acknowledges Possible Saudi Role in Libyan 1969 Coup and Highlights Qadhafi’s Illness

February 27, 2003: US Bush Administration Looking Beyond Iraq to Promote Change in Iran, Libya and Syria
December 11, 2002:
Fresh Coup Attempt Against Qadhafi Involves Family; Highlights Confusion
October 1, 2002:
Weapons Grade Uranium Moving in Middle East; Iraqi WMD and Delivery Development Being Undertaken in Libya
August 14, 2002: UK Promises Qadhafi Support in Exchange for IRA Data
August 7, 2002:
UK Begins Direct Negotiations With Libya “On Flawed Premise”
July 30, 2002:
Time to End the Hypocrisy Over Qadhafi
July 29, 2002: Qadhafi Claims That US Attempting to Replace Him With the Sanusi Monarchy

July 12, 2002:
Qadhafi Orders Killing of Occupants of Entire Libyan Army Base, Then Tells CNN He Opposes Terrorism
May 17, 2002:
New Round of Libya-US-UK Talks Getting Underway, But No Settlement Anticipated
May 9, 2002:
Saif al-Islam, in Bid to Move Into Libyan Decisionmaking, Focuses on Libyan al-Qaida Prisoners at Guantanamo Bay
May 8, 2002:
US Now Focuses Attention on Libya as Hostile State, While Libya Moves Rapidly to Bolster Strategic Ties With Iran
April 29, 2002:
Mubarak Flies to Libya to Seek Funds from Qadhafi
March 27, 2002:
Libya’s Saif al-Islam Admits Prospect of Assuming Leadership; Qadhafi Refuses to Participate in Arab League Summit
March 15, 2002: Libya Expected to Resume More Overtly Radical Approach With Rejection of al-Megrahi Appeal on PA103
March 11, 2002: Libya Continues to Escalate Anti-US, Anti-Israeli Stance Following Breakdown of Talks
March 5, 2002:
US Pressure Expected on Egyptian Pres. Mubarak Over Libya, WMD

February 19, 2002:
Libya’s Succession Preparations Continue as Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi Adds al-Qaida and Radicals to His Militia
February 15, 2002:
Libya Wins State Department Approval to Deal With US Oil Leases, and Then Takes in al-Qaida Captives
February 4, 2002:
Major Changes Continue to Move Libya Into the Forefront of Strategic Focus
February 1, 2002:
The Sanusi and Wahhabi Movements of Islam: Born of the Same Man and Products of Their Culture
January 24, 2002:
False Reports of an Impending Libyan Deal to Compensate PA103 Victims Designed to Cool US Pressures on Qadhafi
January 16, 2002:
Qadhafi’s Problems Persist, Fueling Belief That Compromise Solutions for the Future May be Possible
January 8, 2002:
Reports of New Coup Attempt Against Qadhafi;  Militia of Qadhafi’s Renegade Son Disbanded
January 7, 2002:
Libya at a Watershed as Qadhafi Attempts to Re-Define His Leadership
December 10, 2001:
Qadhafi’s Health at Issue as Libyan Future Debated
November 8, 2001:
Qadhafi Seizes Opportunity to Move Out of Isolation While Expanding Radical Activities, Including CBW Development
January 12, 2001:
Collapse of Lockerbie PA103 Case Changes Strategic Disposition of Libya
November 8, 2000:
Libyan NoDong SSMs Reported Targeting Southern NATO Sites and Israel
May 1, 2000:
An Unstable Qadhafi Seen Ready to Use Window to Pursue Strategic Agenda
September 8, 1999:
Libyan Leader, 30 Years Into His Rule, is Given New Lease of Life


March 25, 2011

Obama Approach to Libya Polarizes NATO, and Further Pushes Turkey into the anti-US Camp

Analysis. By Gregory R. Copley, Editor, GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs. The US Obama Administration’s lack of leadership in helping to resolve the Libyan civil war has, among other things, widened the rift between the US and European members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and has made the US increasingly less influential in global strategic issues.

The confused and reluctant approach of the Obama White House has also clearly exacerbated the rift — which official Washington chooses not to see — between Turkey and the US, and has hastened the move of Turkey into a strategic camp which is hostile to the US.

See: Defense & Foreign Affairs Special Analysis, March 6, 2009: Turkey Makes its Strategic Choice: Russia.

US Pres. Barack Obama specifically set back international efforts to restrain Libyan leader Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi when he telegraphed to Qadhafi the fact that the US would not sustain a protracted military campaign against him; that the air and missile operations of Operation Odyssey Dawn would be of limited duration; and that the US would under no account use ground forces against Qadhafi.

The Obama approach — despite the clear, professional, and comprehensive accomplishment by the US Armed Forces of those tasks assigned to them for the brief engagement — reflected Pres. Obama’s belief that he must be clear of foreign military operations to successfully win a second term in the White House. However, it also reflected the very real knowledge that he and many of his friends and associates have been compromised by funds which had been made available to them by Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi in recent years. This is now an open secret in Washington policy circles.

The US lack of leadership on the Libya question — after Pres. Obama had recently so notably encouraged protestors against the governments of Tunisia and Egypt, and the Government of Bahrain in the face of Iranian-backed protestors — coupled with the military intervention by a number of external governments in the Libyan civil war during March 2011 (as a result of the March 17, 2011, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 of 2011), has served to accelerate growing divisions between European powers: between some European states and the US; and within NATO.

One of the most significant developments has been the growing polarization between Western European states and Turkey, which has become increasingly aligned with Russia and Iran, and which has clearly aligned itself with outgoing Libyan leader Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi.

The emerging alignments on the Libyan question are marrying with other trends which have effectively now ended the fiction that Turkey can become a member of the European Union (EU). Indeed, there is increasingly a view in much of the EU that Turkey is positioning itself as the major problem for the Union and for NATO, but one which still has a significant “gatekeeper” role in affecting the oil and gas traffic from Central Asia and the Caucasus to Western Europe.

Turkey remains a critical transit region, too, for the airlift of non-combat support to US troops in Afghanistan, and is home to a number of US Air Force units and to US nuclear weapons. As a result, many US decisionmakers do not want to face the issue of what a Turkish “defection” from its six decades of alliance with the US would mean. US global strategic doctrine would have to be re-written to reflect the move of Turkey out of the Western camp. Indeed, even the Cold War and post-Cold War concept of “the Western camp” needs to be reconsidered.

It is ironic, then, that the Turkish leadership and US Pres. Obama fundamentally agree in their support for Qadhafi. Turkey has gained commercial success in Libya under Qadhafi, but there is no reason why it could not also prosper if Libya had its democratic and constitutional government restored. But the Turkish Prime Minister has — like so many Washington officials — prospered at the direct or indirect hand of Qadhafi.

See Defense & Foreign Affairs Special Analysis, March 21, 2011: Wider Strategic Factors Emerge as UN-backed “No-Fly Zone” Begins to Take Effect in Libya.

Meanwhile, the US withdrew on March 25, 2011, from its temporary operational leadership of the 12-country coalition — which includes Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Italy, Norway, Qatar, Spain, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates — and allowed NATO as an organization to assume coordination (on March 26, 2011) of the “no-fly zone”. The Turkish Government immediately contested this, and NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen suggested that NATO would resolve this internal NATO challenge over the weekend of March 26-27, 2011. The US military would continue to participate as a supporting member of the enforcement coalition over Libya.

The Obama Administration has portrayed its keenness to minimize US military involvement against Qadhafi as a result of pressures from the US Republican Party majority in the House of Representatives to stop the Administration from entering another conflict without clear objectives or endgame. In reality, Pres. Obama has resisted US military participation against Qadhafi in large part because of his long history of association with Qadhafi, who has financed many around Pres. Obama over the past years. Qadhafi, in a number of his broadcasts during February and March 2011, issued veiled warnings to Obama, saying that Obama would know where his duty lay.

But while US political influence has moved into a period of precipitous decline, including declining influence in Europe, Operation Odyssey Dawn has demonstrated — yet again — the reality that states cannot acquire true, world-class military capabilities merely by buying advanced weapons systems. The Libyan Armed Forces, never trusted by Qadhafi, were consistently denied training, true operational experience, and even the ability undertake live-fire exercises or training in exercises alongside advanced partner forces. This was demonstrated in the UK-Argentine war over the Falkland Islands in 1982.

In that conflict, the only force which operated well for Argentina was the Air Force, which had consistently exercised with the US Air Force. The Argentine, Army, Navy, and Marines had not had recent exposure to any equivalent or superior military force, and thus failed to compete adequately with British forces.

In Libya today, the forces still loyal to Qadhafi have only been able to perform at all against the Constitutional forces opposed to Qadhafi because of better access to weapons and communications, and — more importantly — because the Constitutionalist forces have equally had no training or experience. When Qadhafi’s forces came against first-rate military forces, they have failed to perform even at a basic level. The question facing the Constitutionalist forces in Libya, then, is whether they can now use the breathing spaces the international community has bought for them to build some viable command and control capability to confront Qadhafi’s forces.

This lesson cannot be ignored by other military leaders in Africa and the Middle East. The lesson is that advanced military capabilities cannot be acquired merely by buying advanced military systems.

If that is the case, then second- and third-tier military forces must consider what, indeed, they can do to ensure that they can provide the capabilities required to fulfill their missions. One of the first steps, clearly, is the appropriate selection of adversaries, which requires an emphasis on diplomacy, psychological strategy, and sound strategic intelligence. Another is to ensure that forces are developed to utilize local cultural attributes and then enhanced through adequate adoption of technologies which must become inherent to the logic of those forces.

Qadhafi did not ensure that his armed forces were geared to any goal other than to intimidate his own population. Significantly, as well, the anti-Qadhafi forces — those who have been suppressed since 1969 — failed to prepare for the eventuality which they knew must come: the collapse of Qadhafi’s Government, or his death or flight. The opposition forces talked incessantly for four decades, but failed to make any plans for what has occurred in 2011, and that failure is also showing now.


Albania Government Selling Weapons to Qadhafi

From GIS South-East Europe Station, Thessaloniki. In January 2010, MEICO, a company owned by the Ministry of Defense of Albania, engaged in a complex operation of exporting 150,000 82mm mortar shells to Libya. Two Serbian arms smugglers made this export possible. One of them was Slobodan Tesic, who violated the UN weapons embargo to provide weapons to Pres. Charles Taylor in Liberia; the other was Zoran Damianovic, who in July 2005 spent a short time in prison in Montenegro for attempted smuggling of a thousand M70 and M72 Zastava assault rifles. [The Zastava is a reverse-engineered AK-47 Kalashnikov assault rifle variant.]

The export order to Libya for the 150,000 82mm mortar rounds was made to a Montenegrin company, Yugoimport, a subsidiary of the Serbian weapons company Yugoimport SDPR according to the EUC (end user certificate) and the cargo manifest and the bill of lading of the vessel which transported them. The payment was made through Niksicka Banka of Montenegro, a bank with long ties to the weapons trade of the Ministry of Defense of Albania.

Significantly, Montenegro, a small country of 600,000 inhabitants, was shown as importing 150,000 82mm mortar shells at a time when its military, by 2009, had phased out the 82mm mortar from its military inventory.

According to the records of Harbor Master Office of Durres Port (the main port of Albania) and the Center for the Surveillance of Sea Space situated at Plepa, five miles away from Durres Port (the center there is run by the Albanian Navy), the vessel loaded with the containers full of mortar shells followed a south-south-west course in the Adriatic Sea. Montenegro, ostensibly the intended destination, lies on the Adriatic shore, north of Albania.

This riddle of a vessel with a northerly destination sailing south can be solved thanks to the Port Clearance document issued by the office of the Harbor Master of Libyan port of Ras Lanuf, proving that the vessel left Ras Lanuf port empty after unloading the cargo there. This Port Clearance of Ras Lanuf was handed over to the Albanian Port authorities after the vessel returned to Durres Port.

The Niksicka Banka paid for the purchase of the 150,000 mortar rounds with funds from a Libyan company, LAFIC (Libyan Arab Foreign Investment Company). On February 23, 2011, insurgents and defecting soldiers stormed the SA-5 (NATO designation; Russian designation is S-200) surface-to-air missile (SAM) air defense base near Tobruk. They filmed seized caches of weapons and ammunition there, verifying — in the process — the Albanian sale.


Libya’s Tribal Complexity Drives the 2011 Civil War

Analysis. By GIS Staff. Libya has some 140 major tribes, most broken into clans, and it was this complexity of tribes — which vary in culture and religious approach based on their geography and history — which drove the creation of the 1951 Constitution and cemented the national acceptance of the Senussiyyah movement as the natural leadership group for Libya.

The Senussi family, the doyen of which — Seyyid Mohamed ibn Ali al-Senussi, known as al-Senussi al-Kabir — formed the Senussi sect of Islam in the late 18th Century, and this exceptionally moderate sect of Islam was adopted across much of Libya and other communities in North and West Africa and the Middle East. As a result, the Senussi family was able to be accepted in a leadership capacity in Libya, given that it did not represent a single Libyan tribe.

See Defense & Foreign Affairs Special Analysis, February 1, 2002: The Sanusi and Wahhabi Movements of Islam, Born of the Same Man and Products of Their Culture.

The present Libyan crisis represents the inevitable resurrection of the concept that none of the Libyan tribes wishes to be dominated by another. The September 1969 coup by Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi — it was a junior officer coup, not a revolution — eventually meant that the Qadhadhfa tribe placed itself over the others. The sudden appearance in February 2011 throughout Libya of the flag of the 1951 Senussi Constitution indicated the pent-up frustration over the four decades of Qadhadhfa domination.

It also showed how corrupt the Qadhafi Administration had become compared with the elected leadership of King Idris I, and the democratic parliamentary system he instituted, before Lt. Qadhafi seized power while the King was abroad for medical treatment in 1969.

Transliteration of tribal names varies according to the translator, but the predominant Libyan tribes and ethnic groups include:

http://128.121.186.47/ISSA/reports/Libya/index.htm

Kategorien:Geo Politik Schlagwörter: , , ,
  1. Februar 12, 2013 um 7:55 pm

    Just what exactly seriously inspired u to publish “ISSAs Libya Policy Group (LPG) has hundreds of reports on
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  2. navy
    Oktober 18, 2015 um 4:49 pm

    15.10.2015

    27 years later, prosecutors identify two new Lockerbie bombing suspects
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    http://www.globalpost.com/article/6669564/2015/10/15/two-new-suspects-identified-1988-terrorist-bombing-pan-am-flight-103

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