Geheim Dokumente wurden nun veröffentlicht, wo man die verbrecherische Energie der US Politiker sieht, inklusive der gekaufen und korrupten Deutschen Politik Gestalten, welche jedes Wahnsinn mitmachen.
Atom Bomben Krieg über Deutschland, ist eine Langzeit Planung der USA, wie auch Willy Wimmer über NATO Übungen erklärte, und eine dieser Strategischen Übungen mit Helmut Kohl deshalb verliess.
„Der Plan sah die <> von 1.100 Flugplätzen und 1.200 Städten vor. Moskau wäre von 180 Atombomben zerstört worden, Leningrad von 145, Peking von 23. Zahlreiche <> wären <> zerstört worden um den radioaktiven Niederschlag zu erhöhen >>. Unter ihnen Ost-Berlin, wobei das nukleare Bombardement <> gehabt hätte.“
Kanonenschläge zum Jahresende
Die Veröffentlichung einer Liste der nuklearen Ziele, aufgestellt während des kalten Krieges, durch die offiziellen Archive der US-Regierung, erfolgt nicht aus dem Willen historische Studien zu unterstützen. Sie ist eine Warnung, wenn nicht gar eine Drohung an Russland.
Voltaire Netzwerk | Rom (Italien) | 3. Januar 2016
U.S. Cold War Nuclear Target Lists Declassified for First Time
According to 1956 Plan, H-Bombs were to be Used Against Priority “Air Power” Targets in the Soviet Union, China, and Eastern Europe
Major Cities in Soviet Bloc, Including East Berlin, Were High Priorities in “Systematic Destruction” for Atomic Bombings
Plans to Target People (“Population”) Violated International Legal Norms
SAC Wanted a 60 Megaton Bomb, Equivalent to over 4,000 Hiroshima Atomic Weapons
National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 538
Edited by William Burr
Posted – December 22, 2015
For more information, contact:
William Burr: 202.994.7000 or firstname.lastname@example.org.
Key Targets for SAC Forces (Interactive map, click on targets to see more information)
Using data from the SAC study, this Google map shows the top 20 Soviet bloc airfields of more than 1100 that SAC listed as targets for its Air Power attack [See section 6 for complete list]. The map also shows the locations of five of the major Soviet bloc cities that SAC included in its list of over 1200 potential urban targets: East Berlin, Warsaw, Leningrad, Moscow, and Beijing [Peiping] and their suburbs. Linked to each city is a spread sheet that lists the various installations SAC targeted for destruction and total numbers of installations targeted for the five urban areas. Compiling these spread sheets required the laborious matching of the information in the Category Code List (section 3) with the data in the city lists in the “Systematic Destruction” sections of the SAC report [see sections 5 and 7 for excerpts]. After all the category code items for each city were counted, it could be determined how many and what type of military, industrial, transportation, power, and communications installations, among other target types, had been slated for destruction. The data on numbers of nuclear weapons assigned to destroy the various objectives has been excised, but there is probably no correlation between those numbers and the numbers of installations in each city.
Washington, D.C., December 22, 2015 – The SAC [Strategic Air Command] Atomic Weapons Requirements Study for 1959, produced in June 1956 and published today for the first time by the National Security Archive www.nsarchive.org, provides the most comprehensive and detailed list of nuclear targets and target systems that has ever been declassified. As far as can be told, no comparable document has ever been declassified for any period of Cold War history.
The SAC study includes chilling details. According to its authors, their target priorities and nuclear bombing tactics would expose nearby civilians and “friendly forces and people” to high levels of deadly radioactive fallout. Moreover, the authors developed a plan for the “systematic destruction” of Soviet bloc urban-industrial targets that specifically and explicitly targeted “population” in all cities, including Beijing, Moscow, Leningrad, East Berlin, and Warsaw. Purposefully targeting civilian populations as such directly conflicted with the international norms of the day, which prohibited attacks on people per se (as opposed to military installations with civilians nearby).
The National Security Archive, based at The George Washington University, obtained the study, totaling more than 800 pages, through the Mandatory Declassification Review (MDR) process (see sidebar).
The SAC document includes lists of more than 1100 airfields in the Soviet bloc, with a priority number assigned to each base. With the Soviet bomber force as the highest priority for nuclear targeting (this was before the age of ICBMs), SAC assigned priority one and two to Bykhov and Orsha airfields, both located in Belorussia. At both bases, the Soviet Air Force deployed medium-range Badger (TU-16) bombers, which would have posed a threat to NATO allies and U.S. forces in Western Europe.
A second list was of urban-industrial areas identified for “systematic destruction.” SAC listed over 1200 cities in the Soviet bloc, from East Germany to China, also with priorities established. Moscow and Leningrad were priority one and two respectively. Moscow included 179 Designated Ground Zeros (DGZs) while Leningrad had 145, including “population” targets. In both cities, SAC identified air power installations, such as Soviet Air Force command centers, which it would have devastated with thermonuclear weapons early in the war.
According to the study, SAC would have targeted Air Power targets with bombs ranging from 1.7 to 9 megatons. Exploding them at ground level, as planned, would have produced significant fallout hazards to nearby civilians. SAC also wanted a 60 megaton weapon which it believed necessary for deterrence, but also because it would produce “significant results” in the event of a Soviet surprise attack. One megaton would be 70 times the explosive yield of the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima.
SAC Nuclear Planning for 1959
by William Burr
SAC’s top priority for destruction was Soviet “air power” because of the apparent immediate threat that Soviet bombers posed to the continental United States and to U.S. forces in Europe and East Asia. The report’s detailed introduction explained that the priority given to Air Power (BRAVO) targets dictated the surface bursting of high-yield thermonuclear weapons to destroy priority targets, including airbases in Eastern Europe. That tactic would produce large amounts of radioactive fallout compared to bursting weapons in the air. According to the study, “the requirement to win the Air Battle is paramount to all other considerations.”
The “greatly compressed time factor”—the danger of a speedy Soviet attack and counterattack– encouraged targeters to require the surface bursting of high-yield nuclear weapons. According to SAC, bursting the weapon in the air would “result in decrease of blast effect.” Detonating the weapon on or close to the ground would maximize blast effects, destroy the target, and disperse irradiated particles which would be picked up by winds and descend far and near.
According to the study, SAC planners placed “prime reliance” on blast effects, finding that thermal and radiation effects were “relatively ineffective.” As Lynn Eden has demonstrated in her study, Whole World on Fire, the Air Force’s World War II experience encouraged target planners to emphasize blast effects when they tried to estimate the damage that nuclear weapons would cause. The resulting “blast frame” of mind overlooked the significant devastation caused by other nuclear weapons effect such as radiation and mass fires. 
Believing that a “favorable decision may be reached in the initial stages” SAC thought it essential to achieve high levels of damage. Accordingly, target planners wanted to be sure that enough firepower was launched to assure a 90 percent chance of destroying targets in the airpower category: collapsing above-ground structures or cratering airbase runways and underground facilities.
SAC laid out the numbers and types of nuclear weapons required to destroy each DGZ. The nuclear weapons information is completely excised from the report making it impossible to know how many weapons SAC believed were necessary to destroy the various targets. In any event, SAC could anticipate a very large stockpile of nuclear weapons by 1959 to target priority objectives. This was a period when the nuclear weapons stockpile was reaching large numbers, from over 2400 in calendar 1955 to over 12,000 in calendar 1959 and reaching 22,229 in 1961.
The Air Power and Systematic Destruction lists were not final lists of targets for a military plan. Nuclear war planning was always in a state of change because new intelligence information would become available and change the understanding of which targets had greater priority. It is clear that SAC anticipated further refinement of target lists. The target study included language about the “nomination” of objectives in all of the areas, Soviet Union, China, and the Eastern European satellites, which were responsive to the goal of destroying air power and “war-making” capability.
Air Power Target System
SAC’s top priority for destruction, the Soviet bloc’s air power, was a complex target system. Before the Soviet Union acquired the atomic bomb and significant capability to deliver nuclear weapons at long distances, SAC’s priority had been the destruction of the Soviet urban-industrial complex, but during the mid-1950s the “greatly compressed time factor” produced a reversal. In the SAC Atomic Weapons Requirements Study for 1959, SAC broadly defined the “Air Power” target: air and missile bases for strategic and tactical forces, defensive and offensive, but also government and military control centers that would direct the air battle and nuclear weapons storage sites, air industry, atomic industry, and petroleum-oil-lubricants (POL) storage areas. To this extent, the Air Power category cut across some of the major categories of target systems that Pentagon planners had developed in the early 1950s: strategic nuclear (BRAVO category), conventional forces (ROMEO category), and urban-industrial (DELTA).
Given the expansive definition of Air Power, this suggested that targets in major cities such as Moscow and Leningrad could be subjected to H-bomb attack because both were rich in air power targets. For example, according to the SAC study, the Moscow area had 12 airbases. None of them were even in the top 400 airbases on the list so they may not have been attacked immediately, but Moscow had other potentially higher priority targets: 7 Air Force storage areas, 1 Air Force military control, 1 government control (presumably Kremlin and vicinity), 4 guided missile entities (R&D, production), 5 atomic energy research centers, 11 airframe entities, 6 aircraft engine entities, 2 liquid fuel plants, and 16 liquid fuel storage areas, including refineries. Moreover Moscow had a variety of other non-air military objectives, such as an Army military headquarters, Army and Navy military storage areas, and biological warfare research centers that might have been deemed worthy of attack at the opening of the war.
Leningrad was also a prime candidate for high-yield nuclear weapons aimed at air power targets. It had 12 airbases in the vicinity, as well as such installations as: 1 air frame , 1 aircraft engine, 2 atomic energy research, 2 guided missiles, 3 liquid fuel, 1 Air Force military control, and 4 Air Force military storage areas.
At the heart of the Air Power target system were bases for bombers, missiles, and air defenses. The SAC Atomic Weapons Requirement Study listed alphabetically over 1100 air fields, with a priority number assigned to each. As noted earlier, the number one and number two priority bases on the list were in Belarus—Bykhov and Orsha (a.k.a. Balbasova)—as were four others in the top 20: Baranovichi, Bobruysk (or Babruysk), Minsk/Machulische, and Gomel/Prybytki. Seven of the top 20 were in the Ukraine: Priluki (Pryluky), Poltava, Zhitomir/Skomorokhi, Stryy, Melitpol, Melitpol, and Khorol. Six were in Russia: Pochinok (Shatalovo), Seshcha, Ostrov (Gorokhov), Soltsy, Spassk Dalniy, and Vozdenzhenka. One airfield, Tartu (number 13 in priority), was in Estonia.
Declassified CIA documents suggest why Bykhov and Orsha had such high prominence on the target list. Months before the list was prepared, the CIA’s Current Intelligence Bulletin published an article indicating “Western” military attachés had seen Bison (M-4) jet bombers at Bykhov and possibly also at Orsha, although uncertainty existed as to whether the espied aircraft were Badger [Tu-16] or Bison bombers. In fact, Orsha was becoming a site for Badger bombers, which were slated for strike missions in nearby theaters, such as Western Europe, where they would have posed a threat to NATO allies and U.S. forces. Despite Washington’s fears, the M-4 could not reach the United States on two-way missions (it lacked the technology for aerial refueling), but multiple flyovers of Red Square during a 1954 military parade created fears of a “bomber gap” in Washington. Bykhov was a base for Badger bombers but later became prominent as a base for medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) so it was sure to remain a high priority target