siehe die Website des Auswärtigem Amtes, der SPD Tussi: Katharina Barley. man hat, facebook, Twitter Bildung, oder nennt Quellen, wie Bellingcat, wo ein Musiker, Litaratur Wissenschaftler, ohne Ausbildung, andere bezahlte Verrückte, irgendetwas erfinden und verbreiten.
Der Spiegel wieder einmal im Fakten verdrehen gegen Daniel Ganser, der Lehraufträge an Schweizer Universitäten verlor, als die US Botschafterin intervenierte, weil zu viele Fakten über „Gladio“ kriminelle Praktiken der Amerikaner publik wurden.
Vor vier Jahren starb Frank Schirrmacher – heute ist der Zeitungs-Journalismus am Ende
Rüdiger Suchsland
Jeder weiß, wie man ein Smartphone bedient; die politische Frage lautet umgekehrt: wie man verhindert, dass man vom Smartphone bedient wird.
Der letzte Satz des letzten Artikels von Frank Schirrmacher in der FAZ
Am 12. Juni 2014 starb Frank Schirrmacher – sein Tod markiert das Ende einer Ära, und vier Jahre nach seinem Tod ist nichts mehr übrig geblieben von dem, was Zeitungs-Journalismus vor vier Jahren noch war.
Spieler und Provokateur
Es gibt zwei Dinge, die eine Zeitung interessant machen, und über andere Medien herausheben: Dass sie viele und gute Auslands-Korrespondenten hat, und dass sie in der Lage ist Themen zu setzten und Debatten auszulösen.
Der jetzige deutsche Außenminister und damalige Justizminister Heiko Maas brachte das Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz (NetzDG) unter skandalösen Umständen auf den Weg. Die Zensurmaßnahme NetzDG wurde als „Kampf gegen den Hass im Netz“ verkauft. Klar war den Meisten allerdings, dass damit auch prima abweichende Meinungen und vor allem der allgegenwärtigen Propaganda gegenläufige Informationen aus den sozialen Netzwerken entfernt werden könnten.
Der Journalist Norbert Häring schreibt in dem Artikel „Eine Ergänzung zu Außenminister Heiko Maas und dem Atlantic Council“ über ein entsprechendes Paper: „Mit einer von der Nato finanzierten Broschüre von Februar 2018 machte der Atlantic Council auf gar nicht subtile Weise deutlich, welcher deutsche Politiker das Vertrauen der ‚transatlantischen Gemeinschaft‘ genießt und damit als Außenminister geeignet ist. Dieser Politiker bekam darin als einziger ein Portraitfoto und sein NetzDG eine lobende Erwähnung als vorbildhafte Maßnahme im Kommunikationskampf gegen Russland. Das könnte einerseits helfen zu erklären, warum der beliebteste Politiker der SPD als Außenminister abgesägt werden musste, damit der vielleicht unbeliebteste Politiker der SPD Außenminister werden konnte. Es wirft auch ein ganz neues Licht auf das NetzDG, das bei uns als Maßnahme gegen Hassbotschaften im Internet verkauft wurde, nicht als Zensurmaßnahme gegen russische und russisch infiltrierte Akteure in den sozialen Medien.“.
Mit der russischen Propaganda oder den „russisch infiltrieren Akteuren“ sind dabei natürlich in erster Linie Beiträge und Personen gemeint, die sich gegen die massiven westlichen Propagandalügen zum Überfall fremder Länder und zu ähnlichen Themen wenden. Wer die Mächtigen und ihre Lügen kritisiert, der ist ein „Russentroll“ und Heiko Maas‘ NetzDG, exerziert für Facebook beispielsweise von einer Tochterfirma des Bertelsmannkonzerns und der Propagandagruppe „Correctiv“, die bereits einen Comic zum Abschuss von MH17 gezeichnet hatte, mit dem sie die Schuld am Abschuss Russland zuschob und dafür mit Journalistenpreisen ausgezeichnet wurde. Correctiv bot Facebook sogar an, kostenlos zu zensieren. Gegen den Hass im Netz halt…
In dem Häring-Artikel heißt es weiter: „Weil diese russische Einmischung aber nicht in nennenswertem Maße stattgefunden hat, schließt der Atlantic Council: ‚Das Problem ist breiter als Russland oder ein anderer Einzelakteur. Eine demokratische Antwort auf bösartige Einflussnahme muss die ganze Gesellschaft einbeziehen. Wir müssen zusammearbeiten und von den gegenseitigen Fehlern und Erfolgen lernen.‘. In diesem Zusammenhang wird das NetzDG von Heiko Maas gelobt, mit dem erwähnten Portrait des Ministers, auf gleicher Ebene und direkt vor dem Lob für East StratCom der EU und StratComCenter of Excellence der Nato.“.
Wir „lernen“ also: Die ganze Gesellschaft muss auf Propagandalinie gebracht werden. Abweichler sind Feindagenten. Heiko Mass NetzDG ist eine tolle Waffe der NATO gegen die widerspenstige Bevölkerung.
Es ist unheimlich, wie offen hier über das Aushebeln von Demokratie und Meinungsfreiheit in verstörend freudiger Weise gesprochen wird. Und noch schlimmer ist, dass sich die Menschen das bieten lassen.
15. Juni 2018 um 14:07 Uhr | Verantwortlich: Albrecht Müller
Zwei Beispiele und Belege dafür: erstens ein Auszug aus dem heutigen Handelsblatt-Morning-Briefing des Chefredakteurs des Blattes und zweitens der Titel des „Spiegel“ dieser Woche mit einem Einführungstext des stellvertretenden Chefredakteurs des Spiegel. Albrecht Müller.
Weil diese russische Einmischung aber nicht in nennenswertem Maße stattgefunden hat, schließt der Atlantic Council:
Das Problem ist breiter als Russland oder ein anderer Einzelakteur. Eine demokratische Antwort auf bösartige Einflussnahme muss die ganze Gesellschaft einbeziehen. Wir müssen zusammenarbeiten und von den gegenseitigen Fehlern und Erfolgen lernen.
In diesem Zusammenhang wird das NetzDG von Heiko Maas gelobt, mit dem erwähnten Portrait des Ministers, auf gleicher Ebene und direkt vor dem Lob für East StratCom der EU und StratComCenter of Excellence der Nato.
Interessant auch, was man in der Einleitung erfährt, dass nämlich der Atlantic Council in diesen Fragen intensiv mit europäischen Journalisten, Aktivisten und Regierungsvertretern beraten hat, und dass er im September 2017 in Washington ein von der Nato gesponsertes „transatlantisches Forum“ namens StratCom DC abhielt, zu dem mehr als 100 dieser „Experten“ und Politiker aus fast jedem europäischen Land kamen. Man wüsste zu gern, wer diese Journalisten, Regierungsvertreter und Experten waren. Das erfährt man aber leider auch auf der Website von StratCom DC nicht. Dafür erfährt man in einem Video vom Stellvertretenden Nato-Generalsekretär Alexander Vershbow, dass Desinformation ein russisches Wort sei und Stalin die Desinformation erfunden habe.
*Im Englischen Original ist die Grammatik nicht stimmig: „… aim of shielding Moscow’s autocracy from liberal influence and easing Russia’s domination of its Neighbors.“
Nur Lügen, absolute Inkompetenz zelebrierte Zuckerberg vor dem Untersuchungs Ausschuss des US Kongresses. Eine billige CIA und NSA Nebenstelle, welche die Daten der User verkauft, für jede Art von Betrug und doch machen aktiv Weltweit die gesamte Mainstream Mafia da aktiv mit, nur um im google besser gewertet zu werden.
Viel zu spät, lädt nun das Europaparlament Zuckerberg vor, wo erneut die korrupte EU Commission, diese Umtriebe ermöglichte, förderte, sogar inklusive Angela Merkel Partner war, was durch Fotos und Meetings dokumentiert ist.
After watching the Facebook founder and CEO’s 48-hour trip to Capitol Hill, there are two possible conclusions: either Mark Zuckerberg deliberately misled Congress, or Mark Zuckerberg knows very little about his own company. Both are bad.
Again and again, before both Senate and House committees, Zuckerberg pleaded ignorance about the company he created and has controlled for 14 years. Zuckerberg wasn’t dodging questions about obscure corners of the company or corporate minutiae, but the most plainly fundamental aspects of Facebook’s business and privacy policies. Rather than the congressional beatdown many had expected, the most striking aspect of Zuckerberg’s testimony wasn’t his painful apologias or excuse-spinning, but his ability to spend nearly 10 hours saying almost nothing. The hearings may prove to be a sea change moment for Facebook and the greater data-mining industrial complex, but it would be hard to say the public learned much of anything.
When Sen. Kamala Harris asked Zuckerberg, on the subject of Cambridge Analytica, whether the company had any conversations about whether to inform the 87 million users affected, the CEO replied, “I don’t know if there were any conversations at Facebook overall because I wasn’t in a lot of them,” and finally “I don’t remember a conversation like that.”
When asked by Sen. Maria Cantwell whether Facebook employees had helped with Cambridge Analytica’s work: “Senator, I don’t know.”
When asked about the role of Palantir, a data-mining defense contractor co-founded by Facebook board member and early Zuckerberg ally Peter Thiel: “I’m not really that familiar with what Palantir does.”
Zuckerberg acted similarly confused when asked whether Facebook does things it openly says it does on its own website. When Sen. Roger Wicker asked Zuckerberg if he could confirm whether “Facebook can track a user’s internet browsing activity, even after that user has logged off of the Facebook platform,” the CEO replied, “Senator — I — I want to make sure I get this accurate, so it would probably be better to have my team follow up afterwards.”
The answer is categorically, unequivocally yes, according to Facebook.com: “If you’re logged out or don’t have a Facebook account and visit a website with the Like button or another social plugin, your browser sends us a more limited set of info.”
When Sen. Roy Blunt asked Zuckerberg whether Facebook tracks users across devices (say, from their iPhone to their iPad), he replied that he was “not sure of the answer to that question.”
Meanwhile, on Facebook.com:
On 13 separate occasions on his first day of testimony, Zuckerberg told senators that he would have his “team” eventually “follow up” with an answer.
Zuckerberg’s evasiveness, to put it politely, continued well into the House hearing, including examples that less generous observers might call “lies”:
……………………………..
Mark Zuckerberg seems to have either lied to Congress or not have very much beyond a Wikipedia level of familiarity with his own company.
It’s not out of the question that Zuckerberg really doesn’t know much about Facebook. In recent years, he’s been more visible on his strange Silicon Valley-meets-America goodwill tour, posing for photos in diners and atop tractors, than weighing in on actual Facebook matters. It’s also worth remembering that COO Sheryl Sandberg is only the most recent (and prominent) “adult” brought into Facebook to govern where Zuckerberg is unable or unwilling; Antonio García Martínez, who worked at Facebook for two years as a product manager helping the company pioneer new ad targeting methods, claimed in an interview that Zuckerberg “outsources much of the CEO job to Sheryl,” and could actually be as ignorant as he appeared on the Hill. (Facebook did not immediately respond to a request for comment.)……..
Inzwischen wird in den USA ermittelt, gegen die Firma RapisScan, eine Betrugs und Bestechungsfirma, weil sie die Nationale Sicherheit untergräbt u.a. mit ihren Betrugs Geschäfte in Albanien. Von Beginn an waren Mafia Partner geplant, enorme Bestechungssummen gezahlt worden an Sokol Olldashi, Salih Berisha, der mit einem Strohmann auftrat, als Firmen Teilhaber und die restlichen Anteile für ein . 3,50 € kaufen konnte, wo die Vertrags Bngungen und Service nie erfüllt wurden. Eines der grössten Probleme heute in Albanien und dann schwafelt der US Botschafter ständig etwas von Korruption, wo es wie so oft die Betrugs Geschäfte der Amerikaner sind welche erpresst werden. siehe Frank Wisner, Bechtel, Albpetrol, Bankers Petroleum, AAEF Fund, American Bank of Albanien – USAID Betrugs Geschäfte
We could find little about Dr. Peçini other than he founded a hospital in Tirana: Troubled History of the Concession Award Early in OSIS’s bid for the concession (late 2011), former Prime Minister Berisha added a bonus of eight percentage points to OSIS’s bid, which obviously advantaged OSIS vis-à-vis competitors (translation by Google): 11 OSIS was awarded the concession in August 2013. At the time Berisha was still prime minister, and his party (the Democratic Party), controlled government although his term was about to end. In June of that year, the opposition party (the Socialists) had won the largest share of seats in parliament. The Socialists and their partners selected a new prime minister, and the old government left office in September 2013. The approval of the transfer of 49% of S2 Albania’s 11 Official Notebook of the Republic of A lbania, December 1, 2011. Page 9 of 19 shares occurred on the day Berisha’s finance minister left office (and the new one took office), September 13, 2013. 12 The concession appears to have been more lucrative than OSIS had originally proposed to make it. OSIS reportedly initially proposed a scanning fee of US$32; however, when the concession was approved, the fee to be charged was € 39 (or approximately US$50). 13 ,14 There was significant backlash in the Albanian business community to the fees and the breadth of their imposition – the € 39 was to be levied on all customs declarations – including on electricity, and goods transiting Albania. 15 (In other words, the fee was levied regardless of whether the goods actually underwent scanning.) Some referred to this as a “Super Tax”. 16 Upon taking power, the Socialists refused to implement the concession agreement, and urged OSIS to renegotiate it. In 2014, OSIS filed for arbitration, calling for US$359 million in compensation. In Albania, there was ultimately a media firestorm over the controversial concession, with various media referring to the concession as a “theft”, the collusion behind the concession award a “mafia”, and repeatedly calling the award “corrupt” . 12 The new finance minister’s appointment became official upon publication of his appointment in the official gazette, which occurred on September 13, 2013. 13 See p. 50 of https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:VfbFWG – ot4sJ:https://www.parlament.al/wp -content/uploads/2015/11/proc_29_10_2015_ 14 Assuming EUR/USD 1.32. 15 See p. 49 of https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:VfbFWG – ot4sJ:https://www.parlament. al/wp -content/uploads/2015/11/proc_29_10_2015_ 16 See p. 49 of https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/se arch?q=cache:VfbFWG – ot4sJ:https://www.parlament.al/wp -content/uploads/2015/11/proc_29_10_2015_ Page 10 of 19 The below TV news program calls the S2 Albania concession the “Theft of the Century”: Page 11 of 19 Yet, when asked about the delay in implementing the contract in Albania, management never spoke of the 49% share transfer for approximately $4.50; nor of the additional eight points former PM Berisha awarded; nor of the company’s physician joint venture partner; nor of the excessive scanning fees and the breadth of their imposition; and, they never attempted any explanation for what was fueling the new government’s challenge to the concession agreement. Instead, in the midst of all of this movement and chaos in Albania, management’s discussion of the problem evoked stillness : 17 “Last year, we announced a 15-year contract that we received from the government of Albania to provide turnkey cargo and vehicle screening s ervices at various sites throughout the country of Albania. Unfortunately, we recently learned that the customer, the Albanian newly elected government, has halted further progress on the contract and put into doubt the continuation of the program. The pro gram had been proceeding smoothly and ahead of schedule. We intend to strongly enforce our contractual rights and hope to reach an amicable outcome… You can understand that, under the circumstances, we cannot comment further at this time.” 18 OSIS obviously could have commented further, but simply chose not to because these transactions are, in our view, unjustifiable. In 2015, the government and OSIS reached a settlement. Interestingly, the Democrats (as an opposition party) voiced opposition to the settlement, which appears to be less lucrative for OSIS (and its joint venture partner). Head of parliament’s economics commission Erion Brace gave a scathing critique of the award of the concession in parliament in 2015. 19 OSIS management still told the market nothing of the facts underlying this controversy – it was apparently back to business. In recent conversations between an investor and OSIS, when asked, the company refused to provide details on any joint ventures it has in Albania. OSIS’s failure at that time to disclose even the scantest fact that’s freely available on the Albanian cor porate registry bolsters our opinion that these facts evidence corruption. S2 Albania Transfer Off the Books? OSIS’s accounts are likely misstated because they appear not to reflect the transfer of the stake in S2 Albania. S2 Albania has not filed its required CY 2016 financial statements, so we are unsure of its profit; however, we assume that it is large enough that the portion of profits belonging to ICMS / Dr. Peçini (or their backers) should be deducted on the income statement in a line item called “Noncontrolling Interests” (or “Minority Interests”), which would be in between Net Income and Net Income to Common Shareholders. Yet, there is no such line. Offering documents for OSIS’s 1.25% convertible senior notes due 2022 support our suspicion that the transfer has been kept off OSIS’s books. In the Purchase Agreement with the 17 “In the midst of movement and chaos, keep stillness inside of you” – the other Deepak Chopra 18 Deepak Chopra, Aug. 25, 2014 conference call. 19 https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:VfbFWG -ot4sJ:https://www.parlament.al/wp – content/uploads/2015/11/ proc_29_10_2015_ Page 12 of 19 underwriters, OSIS warrants that except as disclosed in the General Disclosure Package and the Final Offering Memorandum, it owns all of the shares of each Subsidiary: 20 OSIS then includes S2 Albania SHPK in its list of Subsidiaries in Schedule D of the Agreement (see below). 21 We have found no documents other than on the Albanian corporate registry that disclose the minority interest. The Albanians are Getting Paid Though While it could be unclear to an OSIS shareholder whether you own all, or part, of S2 Albania, it seems pretty clear in Albania that someone else owns 49%. On December 7, 2013 – prior to ICMS even formally receiving its interest in S2 Albania – ICMS entered into a pledge agreement with National Commercial Bank for a € 1.9 million loan. Under the agreement, Dr. Peçini pledged his shares of ICMS as collateral for the loan. However, we believe that ICMS’s only material asset is its ownership in S2 Albania. In ICMS’s corporate registry file reads that “ICMS approves the obligation imposed by the Bank for the obtainment of the prior approv al of the Bank in case ICMS decided to transfer its shares in S2 Albania.” Rather than pledging the S2 Albania shares, which it did not yet formally own and which would need Ministry of Finance approval to pledge, ICMS agreed to encumber any transfer in e xchange for the loan. It appears from ICMS’s financials that it has not received any dividends from S2 Albania through December 31, 2016; however, it was able to extract some initial value. 20 OSIS February 15, 2017 8 -K, Exhibit 1.1, p. 5. 21 OSIS February 15, 2017 8 -K, Exhibit 1.1, Sch E -1. Page 13 of 19 Mexico – Inflated Pricing, Potentially at Risk Contract The original contract in Mexico appears to have been substantially overpriced and oversold in terms of capabilities. We base these conclusions on i) an analysis showing the seemingly outsized profitability of the contract, and ii) conversations our investigators spoke with a former senior SAT official who had extensive knowledge of the contract, the machines, and their capabilities. In the former official’s view, the contract price is greatly inflated, and was based on a false promise about the machines’ capabilities that he calls “a lie”. If our understanding of the overpricing is correct, it could have profound implications for OSIS’s attempt to renew the contract – possibly leading to less favorable terms or non-renewal. Based on the assumptions and analysis that follows, we estimate that OSIS’s turnkey contract in Mexico generated approximately $65 million to $70 million of EBITDA in FY2017, which would have been more than 50% of total company EBITDA. Given our estimate of the materiality of this contract, a non-renewal or a sizable downward adjustment in pricing would seemingly have a significant impact on OSIS’s financials. Mexico Turnkey EBITDA Estimate We estimate that the Mexico S2 turn key contract generates about $65 million to $70 million of EBITDA annually, which is an EBITDA margin of approximately 55% to 59% (compared to that of the rest of the business, which would seem to generate an EBITDA margin of only about 7.5%). The Mexico turnkey contract therefore likely generates over half of OSIS’s total company EBITDA. When an investor recently asked OSIS investor relations to comment on whether the estimate of EBITDA compos ition is reasonably accurate, the company refused to comment. Below is the Mexico segment by year from FY2012-FY2017. 22 We assume substantially all Mexico revenue is from the turnkey contract. 22 FY2012 -2014: FY2014 10- K, pp. F -34- F35; FY2015 -2017: FY2017 10- K, pp. F43 -F44. Page 14 of 19 The key to our estimate methodology is looking at changes between FY2012 (when the Mexico contract was negligible) to FY2014 (when the contract appears to hav e fully ramped). As shown above, the company disclosed the Mexico segment revenue; but, we need to estimate its corresponding operating profit. As shown below, we see that the security division operating profit margin was approximately 8%, which is roughly consistent with what it had been in FY2010 and 2011. However, in FY2014, we see a jump in segment operating profit margin to 13.5%, which we assume is due to the Mexico turnkey contract. The final task is to solve for the margin associated with the incremental revenue from Mexico. First, we note that outside of the Mexico turnkey contract, Security Division revenue declined between FY2012 and FY2013. We use the decrease in comp revenue to estimate the incremental operating profit from Mexico in 2013. We assume that the lost $81.5 million of comp revenue in FY2013 had an operating profit margin of 8.0%. Taking that, we estimate how much operating profit the Security D ivision lost with the decrease of comp revenue ($6.5 million). The increase i n FY2013 Security Division operating profit should therefore be due to the incremental revenue under the Mexico turnkey contract. Once we calculate the incremental operating profit from the Mexico turnkey contract, we divide it by the incremental revenue from the contract. The result is an operating profit margin of 31.9%: Page 15 of 19 The same methodology in FY2014 produces an operating profit margin of 27.9%: Comparing the change between FY2012 and FY2014, we estimate a Mexico operating profit margin of 30.1%: Applying a 30.0% operating profit margin to FY2017 Mexico revenue of $119.9 million yields an estimated operating profit of $36.0 million (excluding the impairment, which has no impact on the EBITDA calculation). We believe a depreciation and a mortization estimate of $30.0 million to $35.0 million per year is reasonable for Mexico, which is based on: • Security Division D&A increased by $32.8 million between FY2012 and FY2014, which is the year after Mexico fixed assets should reached their peak values. • If we assume that YoY changes in Mexico long lived assets beginning in FY2015 are due to depreciation, we get respective annual depre ciation expense in FY2015-FY2016 of $36.6 million and $38.9 million (including impairments). • Mexico turnkey capex appears to total approximately $225 million. If we assume a 10% residual value and a six-year depreciation schedule (to match the contract life), annual depreciation would have averaged $33.8 million. In this way, we estimate that FY2017 EBITDA from Mexico was approximately $66 million to $71 million. We use an EBITDA denominator of $128.4 million, as we do not add back restructuring and M&A charges (which seem to be a recurring expense for OSIS). Using these estimates and assumptions produces a range of contribution to FY2017 overall company EBITDA of 51.4% to 55.3%. The outsize profitability of the Mexico turnkey contract supports our assessment that contract pricing is greatly inflated. It seems SAT could have saved a great deal of money by purchasing only the machines. While OSIS might trumpet the value of the “services” that come with the contract, there is good reason to doubt there is much value in those. Page 16 of 19 Former SAT Official Calls Services “a Lie” Our investigators spoke with a former senior SAT official who had in -depth knowledge of OSIS’s contract with SAT and the machines’ capabilities. Below are some of his relevant quotes: “This last contract with Rapiscan was a big kind of fallacy…They were selling something that this equipment can’t do. They were supposed to substitute what a man should do on the field. That is identifying quantities, country of origin and many other things that these machines can’t do. That’s why they set a pretty high-priced service, which is unreal. This is one of the main reasons that I’m pretty sure this Rapiscan contract with the Mexican government will not be renewed in any way.” “They are selling that they will tell the government if the goods that are p assing through customs are legal or not, if they paid the correct duties or not, a lot of things that these machines can’t do.” “[The Rapiscan scanners] are just an average machine like any other on the market. The only thing that they are selling is this big, fat contract and that they’re supposed to give a service that has nothing to do with these x-ray machines and they are actually not giving. This has nothing to do with the machine’s capabilities. These machines can do one thing: scan goods or scan vehicles. That’s all that they do and there are so many other brands on the market that do exactly the same. What they are selling is like a complete service with infrastructure that connects these machines to the systems of the Mexican government and gives you, in an automated way, the image and they have a previous filter that tells you if that scan complies with all of the legislation and all of the foreign trade rules that Mexico has. This supposed added value that they are selling is something that no on e can do. There is no way that you could know if those goods are paying the correct taxes, if they are of the country of origin that they are saying on papers, but there’s no way that this x-ray machine could complete the job of the humans that actually wo rks on custom houses. And this is what they sell, not just the x-ray machine service. They sell the x-ray machine service with all the other components that the Mexican government needs to verify everything about goods on custom houses. They say ‘You don’t need humans anymore. With my machines, you will not have to have people there. I will give you the answers and I will give you if everything is correct or if there is something incorrect,’ and that’s a lie. This is the red point on this contract. ” “They just scan. They give you an image, but you don’t know exactly the composition of the goods that are in there. You just can’t imagine if there is something that is out of the pattern and then physically, you need to open the container and look at what is there. Actually, it doesn’t even tell you if that thing that doesn’t match with the pattern of all the goods is an illegal good, if they are guns or if they are drugs. These machines don’t tell you that. They just give you an image, just like an x -ray shows you the bone but it doesn’t tell you anymore. You just see the image of the bone and you can see if there is a fracture or not. It doesn’t tell you more details. These guys are selling that. There is no technology in the world that could give you what th ey sell. This was the main reason for the cost increase because they are selling this unbelievable high. It’s a contract that Page 17 of 19 doesn’t have any reason for being that high.” Former Employees Paint a Picture of Thorough Internal Rot Our investigators spoke with former employees of the Rapiscan business. Several of their comments are enlightening about the extent of rot at the company. • One former employee stated that s/he brought significant accounting problems in a contract in Iraq to the attention of senior management, but that his concerns were dismissed. The source said s/he “found two things that could put me in prison if I had not done anything about it.” The source also reported being told to withdraw cash from a company account to be put into brown envelopes for visiting foreign government officials to use as walking around money. • One former employee refused to speak with our investigators stating only “ I would rather not discuss this business as I felt I had to resign to avoid future risks to my professional credibility and future as a company director.” • Another source described an important overseas Rapiscan distributor as “shady” and stated it was assumed within Rapiscan the distributor was tied to organized crime. This source indicated s/he also had concerns at times while at Rapiscan about whether s/he was being forced to break the law. • One former employee stated that Rapiscan shipped machines out regardless of whether they were finished or not in order to meet monthly sales quotas. The source refereed to these machines as “half-built”. • Two sources said Rapiscan had almost been debarred from doing business from the U.S. government. One of those sources stated that had actually been the case twice. One former senior employee spoke in glowing terms about OSIS’s culture of compliance: “Let me put it this way. The entire time I was there, one of my roles at OSI was [redacted]. And OSI was doctrinaire, exceedingly exacting, for all of its subsidiaries including Rapiscan and S2 and everyone else ab out compliance with the anti-bribery act in the U.K., the EU bribery rules, and of course the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in the United States being that it’s a U.S. corporation with subsidiaries around the world. It has never had any instance, question, violation – primarily because not only is it morally wrong, but from a corporate governance standpoint, any violation of those, even minimal violation of those acts are criminal for the executives, so executives can go to jail. But you also potentially ruin your U.S. government business and European government business, and a huge portion of the revenues of Rapiscan and OSI are with government business.” However, when he was asked to comment on the transfer of 49% of S2 Albania for $4, which occurred while he was there, he replied “I don’t know anything about that.” Given his senior roles at OSIS, we are surprised that he does not know about the Albanian joint venture partner – either way, the transfer was kept tellingly close to the vest, or the source lied about his knowledge of the transfer. Page 18 of 19
RapisScan
RapisScan
shares occurred on the day Berisha’s finance minister left office (and the new one took office),
September 13, 2013.
12
The concession appears to have been more lucrative than OSIS had originally proposed to make
it. OSIS reportedly initially proposed a scanning fee of US$32; however, when the concession
was approved, the fee to be charged was
€
39 (or approximately
US$50).
13
,14
There was
significant backlash in the Albanian business community to the fees and the breadth of their
imposition – the
€
39 was to be levied on all customs declarations – including on electricity, and
goods transiting Albania.
15
(In other words, the fee was levied regardless of whether the goods
actually underwent scanning.) Some referred to this as a “Super Tax”.
16
Upon taking power, the Socialists refused to implement the concession agreement, and urged
OSIS to renegotiate it. In 2014, OSIS filed for arbitration, calling for US$359 million in
compensation.
In Albania, there was ultimately a media firestorm over the controversial concession, with
various media referring to the concession as a “theft”, the collusion behind the concession award
a “mafia”, and repeatedly calling the award “corrupt”
.
12
The new finance minister’s appointment became official upon publication of his appointment in the official
underwriters, OSIS warrants that except as disclosed in the General Disclosure Package and the
Final Offering Memorandum, it owns all of the shares of each Subsidiary:
20
OSIS then includes S2 Albania SHPK in its list of Subsidiaries in Schedule D of the Agreement
(see below).
21
We have found no documents other than on the Albanian corporate registry that
disclose the minority interest.
The Albanians are Getting Paid Though
While it could be unclear to an OSIS shareholder whether you own all, or part, of S2 Albania,
it
seems pretty clear in Albania that someone else owns 49%. On December 7, 2013 – prior to
ICMS even formally receiving its interest in S2 Albania
– ICMS entered into a pledge agreement
with National Commercial Bank for a
€
1.9 million loan. Under the agreement,
Dr. Peçini
pledged his shares of ICMS as collateral for the loan. However, we believe that ICMS’s only
material asset is its ownership in S2 Albania. In ICMS’s corporate registry file reads that “ICMS
approves the obligation imposed by the Bank for the obtainment of the prior approv
al of the
Bank in case ICMS decided to transfer its shares in S2 Albania.” Rather than pledging the S2
Albania shares, which it did not yet formally own and which would need Ministry of Finance
approval to pledge, ICMS agreed to encumber any transfer in e
xchange for the loan. It appears
from ICMS’s financials that it has not received any dividends from S2 Albania through
December 31, 2016; however, it was able to extract some initial value.
20
OSIS February 15, 2017 8
-K, Exhibit 1.1, p. 5.
21
OSIS February 15, 2017 8
-K, Exhibit 1.1, Sch E
-1.
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Mexico – Inflated Pricing, Potentially at Risk Contract
The original contract in Mexico appears to have been substantially overpriced and oversold in
terms of capabilities. We base these conclusions on i) an analysis showing the seemingly
outsized profitability of the contract, and ii) conversations our investigators spoke with a former
senior SAT official who had extensive knowledge of the contract, the machines,
and their
capabilities. In the former official’s
view, the contract price is greatly inflated, and was based on
a false promise about the machines’ capabilities that he calls “a lie”.
If our understanding of the overpricing is correct, it could have profound implications for OSIS’s
attempt to renew the contract
– possibly leading to less favorable terms or non-renewal. Based
on the assumptions and analysis that follows, we estimate that OSIS’s turnkey contract in
Mexico generated approximately $65
million to $70 million of EBITDA in FY2017, which
would have been more than 50% of total company EBITDA. Given our estimate of the
materiality of this contract, a non-renewal or a sizable downward adjustment in pricing
would
seemingly have a significant impact on OSIS’s financials.
Mexico Turnkey EBITDA Estimate
We estimate that the Mexico S2 turn
key contract generates about $65 million to $70 million of
EBITDA annually, which is an EBITDA margin of approximately 55% to 59% (compared to
that of the rest of the business, which would seem to generate an EBITDA margin of only about
7.5%). The Mexico turnkey contract therefore likely generates over half of OSIS’s total
company EBITDA. When an investor recently asked OSIS investor relations to comment on
whether the estimate of EBITDA compos
ition is reasonably accurate, the company
refused to
comment.
Below is the Mexico segment by year from FY2012-FY2017.
22
We assume substantially all
Mexico revenue is from the turnkey contract.
The key to our estimate methodology is looking at changes between FY2012 (when the Mexico
contract was negligible) to FY2014 (when the contract appears to hav
e fully ramped). As shown
above, the company disclosed the Mexico segment revenue; but, we need to estimate its
corresponding operating profit. As shown below, we see that the security division operating
profit margin was approximately 8%, which is roughly consistent with what it had been in
FY2010 and 2011. However, in FY2014, we see a jump in segment operating profit margin to
13.5%, which we assume is due to the Mexico turnkey contract.
The final task is to solve for the margin associated with the
incremental revenue from Mexico.
First, we note that outside of the Mexico turnkey contract, Security Division revenue declined
between FY2012 and FY2013. We use the decrease in comp revenue to estimate the incremental
operating profit from Mexico in 2013.
We assume that the lost $81.5 million of comp revenue in FY2013 had an operating profit
margin of 8.0%. Taking that, we estimate how much operating profit the Security D
ivision lost
with the decrease of comp revenue ($6.5 million). The increase i
n FY2013 Security Division
operating profit should therefore be due to the incremental revenue under the Mexico turnkey
contract. Once we calculate the incremental operating profit from the Mexico turnkey contract,
we divide it by the incremental revenue
from the contract. The result is an operating profit
margin of 31.9%:
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The same methodology in FY2014 produces an operating profit margin of 27.9%:
Comparing the change between FY2012 and FY2014, we estimate a Mexico operating profit
margin of 30.1%:
Applying a 30.0% operating profit margin to FY2017 Mexico revenue of
$119.9 million yields
an estimated operating profit of $36.0 million
(excluding the impairment, which has no impact
on the EBITDA calculation). We believe a depreciation and a
mortization estimate of $30.0
million to $35.0 million per year is reasonable for Mexico, which is based on:
•
Security Division D&A increased by $32.8 million between FY2012 and FY2014, which
is the year after Mexico fixed assets should reached their peak
values.
•
If we assume that YoY changes in Mexico long lived assets beginning in FY2015 are due
to depreciation, we get respective annual depre
ciation expense in FY2015-FY2016 of
$36.6 million and $38.9 million (including impairments).
•
Mexico turnkey capex appears to total approximately $225 million. If we assume a 10%
residual value and a six-year depreciation schedule (to match the contract life), annual
depreciation would have averaged $33.8 million.
In this way, we estimate that FY2017 EBITDA from Mexico was approximately $66 million to
$71 million. We use an EBITDA denominator of $128.4 million, as we do not add back
restructuring and M&A charges (which seem to be a recurring expense for OSIS). Using these
estimates and assumptions produces a range of contribution to FY2017 overall company
EBITDA of 51.4% to 55.3%.
The outsize profitability of the Mexico turnkey contract supports our assessment that contract
pricing is greatly inflated. It seems SAT could have saved a great deal of money by purchasing
only the machines. While OSIS might trumpet the value of the “services” that come with the
contract, there is good reason to doubt there is much value in those.
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Former SAT Official Calls Services “a Lie”
Our investigators spoke with a former senior SAT official who had in
-depth knowledge of
OSIS’s contract with SAT and the machines’ capabilities.
Below are some of his relevant
quotes:
“This last contract with Rapiscan was a big kind of fallacy…They were selling something
that this equipment can’t do. They were supposed to substitute what a man should do on
the field. That is identifying quantities, country of origin and many other things that these
machines can’t do. That’s why they set a pretty high-priced service, which is unreal. This
is one of the main reasons that I’m pretty sure this Rapiscan contract with the Mexican
government will not be renewed in any way.”
“They are selling that they will tell the government if the goods that are p
assing through
customs are legal or not, if they paid the correct duties or not, a lot of things that these
machines can’t do.”
“[The Rapiscan scanners] are just an average machine like any other on the market. The
only thing that they are selling is this
big, fat contract and that they’re supposed to give a
service that has nothing to do with these x-ray machines and they are actually not giving.
This has nothing to do with the machine’s capabilities.
These machines can do one thing:
scan goods or scan vehicles. That’s all that they do and there are so many other brands on
the market that do exactly the same. What they are selling is like a complete service with
infrastructure that connects these machines to the systems of the Mexican government
and gives you, in an automated way, the image and they have a previous filter that tells
you if that scan complies with all of the legislation and all of the foreign trade rules that
Mexico has. This supposed added value that they are selling is something that no on
e can
do. There is no way that you could know if those goods are paying the correct taxes, if
they are of the country of origin that they are saying on papers, but there’s no way that
this x-ray machine could complete the job of the humans that actually wo
rks on custom
houses. And this is what they sell, not just the x-ray machine service. They sell the x-ray
machine service with all the other components that the Mexican government needs to
verify everything about goods on custom houses. They say ‘You don’t need humans
anymore. With my machines, you will not have to have people there. I will give you the
answers and I will give you if everything is correct or if there is something incorrect,’ and
that’s a lie. This is the red point on this contract.
”
“They just scan. They give you an image, but you don’t know exactly the composition of
the goods that are in there. You just can’t imagine if there is something that is out of the
pattern and then physically, you need to open the container and look at what is
there.
Actually, it doesn’t even tell you if that thing that doesn’t match with the pattern of all the
goods is an illegal good, if they are guns or if they are drugs. These machines don’t tell
you that. They just give you an image, just like an x
-ray shows you the bone but it
doesn’t tell you anymore. You just see the image of the bone and you can see if there is a
fracture or not. It doesn’t tell you more details.
These guys are selling that. There is no
technology in the world that could give you what th
ey sell. This was the main reason for
the cost increase because they are selling this unbelievable high. It’s a contract that
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doesn’t have any reason for being that high.”
Former Employees Paint a Picture of Thorough Internal Rot
Our investigators spoke with former employees of the Rapiscan business. Several of their
comments are enlightening about the extent of rot at the company.
•
One former employee stated that
s/he brought significant accounting problems in a
contract in Iraq to the attention of senior management, but that his concerns were
dismissed. The source said s/he “found two things that could put me in prison if I had not
done anything about it.” The source also reported being told to withdraw cash
from a
company account to be put into brown envelopes for visiting foreign government officials
to use as walking around money.
•
One former employee refused to speak with our investigators stating only “
I would rather
not discuss this business as I felt I had to resign to avoid future risks to my professional
credibility and future as a company director.”
•
Another source described an important overseas Rapiscan distributor as “shady” and
stated it was assumed within Rapiscan the distributor was tied to organized crime. This
source indicated s/he also had concerns at times while at Rapiscan about whether s/he
was being forced to break the law.
•
One former employee stated that Rapiscan
shipped machines out regardless of whether
they were finished or not in order to meet monthly sales quotas. The source
refereed to
these machines as “half-built”.
•
Two sources said Rapiscan had almost been debarred from doing business from the U.S.
government. One of those sources stated that had actually been the case twice.
One former senior employee spoke in glowing terms about OSIS’s culture of compliance:
“Let me put it this way. The entire time I was there, one of my roles at OSI was
[redacted]. And OSI was doctrinaire, exceedingly exacting, for all of its subsidiaries
including Rapiscan and S2 and everyone else ab
out compliance with the anti-bribery act
in the U.K., the EU bribery rules, and of course the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in the
United States being that it’s a U.S. corporation with subsidiaries around the world.
It has never had any instance, question, violation – primarily because not only is it
morally wrong, but from a corporate governance standpoint, any violation of those, even
minimal violation of those acts are criminal for the executives, so executives can go to
jail. But you also potentially ruin your U.S. government business and European
government business, and a huge portion of the revenues of Rapiscan and OSI are with
government business.”
However, when he was asked to comment on the transfer of 49% of S2 Albania for $4, which
occurred while he was there, he replied “I don’t know anything about that.” Given his senior
roles at OSIS, we are surprised that he does not know about the Albanian joint venture partner
–
either way, the transfer was kept tellingly close to the vest, or the source
lied about his
knowledge of the transfer.
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Conclusion
It is ironic that a company integral to enforcing the most ticky
-tack of rules at security
checkpoints seems to pay so little heed to the rules (ahem…laws) governing its conduct of
business. We believe the Albania contract resulted from a massive bribe of half the concession
value. We believe OSIS’s accounts are misstated as a result of this apparent bribe. Mexico
looks to be egregiously priced, which certainly raises questions. Former employees painted a
reasonably consistent picture of a company operating with disregard for the law.
We are
therefore short because this way of doing business just doesn’t seem sustainable.
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Faqja e pare » Posts » Lajme » ‘Në thelb i kalbur’, koncesionari i skanimit përballet me akuza të reja për korrupsion
Lajm7 Dec 2017
‘Në thelb i kalbur’, koncesionari i skanimit përballet me akuza të reja për korrupsion
Kompania amerikane që zotëron 51 % të aksioneve të koncesionit të skanimit të kontenierëve në Shqipëri, është vënë në qendër të akuzave se ka paguar një rryshfet të majmë për sigurimin e kontratës nga qeveria shqiptare.
Vlera e aksioneve të OSI Systems- kompania mëmë e fituesit të koncesionit të skanimit të kontenierëve në Shqipëri, Rapiscan Systems Inc ra pikiatë të mërkurën, pas akuzave për korrupsion që drejtuesi i një kompanie investimesh dhe kërkimesh hulumtuese në Shtetet e Bashkuara i adresoi asaj gjatë një interviste në “Bloomberg”.
Carson Block-themelues i “Muddy Waters Research”, i cili ka fituar reputacion përmes denoncimit të praktikave mashtruese të kompanive ndërkombëtare dhe basteve në bursë deklaroi në “Bloomberg” se kompania OSI Systems është e “në thelb e kalbur” dhe ofroi si argument kontratën koncesionare të fituar në Shqipëri si dhe një kontratë të dytë të madhe të kompanisë në Meksikë.
“Kemi prova të pamohueshme se disa vite më parë, kur kompania fitoi një kontratë në Shqipëri me vlerë nga 150 deri në 250 milionë USD, ata paguan një rryshfet me thuajse gjysmën e atij koncesioni. Për mua kjo është një provë e qartë,” deklaroi Block.
Rapiscan Systems Inc. me bazë në Kaliforni dhe kompania bijë e regjistruar në Shqipëri, S2 Albania fituan një kontratë koncesionare 15-vjeçare për skanimin e kontenierëve nga qeveria e ish-kryeministrit Sali Berisha në vitin 2011. Kontrata u miratua në Parlament dy vjet më vonë dhe hyri në fuqi në prag të zgjedhjeve parlamentare të vitit 2013.
Pak muaj më vonë, në shtator 2013, Rapiscan Systems Inc. shiti 49 për qind të aksioneve të kompanisë koncesionare te kompania shqiptare ICMS shpk., e cila zotërohet nga një mjek dhe sipërmarrës i quajtur Olti Peçini. Sipas kontratës së depozituar në QKR, shitja e 49 për qind të aksioneve u bë për vetëm 490 lekë.
Kur ishte në opozitë, Partia Socialiste e denoncoi koncesionin e skanimit si aferë korruptive të qeverisë “Berisha” dhe me të ardhur në pushtet në vitin 2013, nisi procedurat për prishjen e kontratës por u përball shpejt me një padi në arbitrazh.
Qeveria “Rama 1” kontraktoi studion ligjore Omnia Strategy të Cherie Blair për të përgatitur mbrojtjen kundër Rapiscan, por pasi e pagoi me 645 mijë euro në total, pranoi këshillën e zonjës Blair për ta zgjidhur me marrëveshje konfliktin.
Më 5 qershor 2015, Këshilli i Ministrave dorëzoi në Kuvend marrëveshjen e rinegociuar të koncesionit duke deklaruar se vlera e kontratës ishte ulur nga 316 milionë në 210 milionë euro. Relacioni që shoqëron projektligjin shpjegon se kompania Rapiscan fitonte përmes kontratës së mëparshme 39 euro për çdo deklaratë doganore, ndërsa me marrëveshjen e re përfiton 5 euro për deklarata doganore deri në 1 mijë euro dhe përtej kësaj vlere, taksa shkon 22 euro për deklaratë doganore.
Në bastin e luajtur nga Black kundër kompanisë OSI Systems, akuza për shitjen e 49 për qind të aksioneve në Shqipëri përbën bazën kryesore. Një raport i detajuar i kompanisë së tij “Muddy Waters Research”, të cilin BIRN e disponon, thekson se “korrupsioni në kontratën koncesionare të vitit 2013 në Shqipëri është më i dukshëm se një shishe 3-litërshe me shampo në valixhen e udhëtimit”.
“Koncesioni llogaritet se ka një vlerë nga 150-250 milionë USD. Megjithatë, ose duket se OSI Systems e vlerëson atë me 9 USD, ose ata me gjasë kanë korruptuar dikë duke i dhënë gjysmën e kontratës për 4.50 USD”, shkruan raporti.
“Ne na rezulton se transferta nuk pasqyrohet në llogaritë e OSI Systems, nuk ka zbritje të interesave të paketës jo-kontrolluese në pasqyrën e të ardhurave dhe në dokumentet e ofertës së bonove të vitit 2017 e shfaqin degën [në Shqipëri] si 100 për qind në pronësi të OSI Systems,” shtohet aty.
Përtej kësaj analize financiare, raporti i “Muddy Waters Research” është më tej i mbushur me një pasqyrë të akuzave politike në Shqipëri, raportimeve mediatike mbi koncesionin e skanimit si dhe dokumente dhe ekstrakte të shkarkuara nga Qendra Kombëtare e Biznesit, QKB.
Që prej shitjes së aksioneve në vitin 2013, kompania koncesionare S2 Albania zotërohet në 51 për qind të aksioneve nga Rapiscan Systems Inc dhe në 49 për qind të aksioneve nga ICMS sh.p.k e Olti Peçinit. Të dhënat në QKB tregojnë se administrator i kompanisë është Jonathan Fleming, një ish-punonjës i lartë i sigurisë në qeverinë federale në SHBA.
BIRN e pati të pamundur të kontaktonte me administratorin Fleming, ndërsa aksioneri i minorancës, Olti Peçini nuk iu përgjigj një kërkese për koment mbi akuzat për korrupsion që vijnë nga Shtetet e Bashkuara lidhur me shitjen e aksioneve në favor të tij për 490 lekë.
Ndërkohë në Shtetet e Bashkuara, rënia e vlerës së aksioneve të kompanisë OSI Systems u cilësua si “reagim i tepruar” nga analisti i kompanisë Drexel Hamilton, Brian Ruttenbur, ndërsa vlerësoi se faktet në raport janë të pasakta dhe se sipas tij, “Muddy Waters Research” nuk kishte tentuar të kontaktonte me drejtues të kompanisë.
Sa i përket kontratës në Shqipëri, ai theksoi se ishte “një ndërmarrje e përbashkët”.
“Siç e kuptojmë ne situatën, partneri i kompanisë në Shqipëri ishte/është përgjegjës për investime të rëndësishme në përgatitjet në terren. Vërejmë se përgatitjet në terren mund të kushtojnë miliona dollarë për lokacionin dhe marrin kohë domethënëse për t’u kryer [ ndonjëherë është një proces i vështirë për të përgatitur vendin përpara instalimit të pajisjeve të skanimit],” citohet të ketë thënë Ruttenbur në StreetInsider.
“Ne vlerësojmë se OSI Systems gjeneron më pak se 10 milionë USD në vit nga Shqipëria. OSI [sipas marrëveshjes] njeh të ardhurat e plota dhe e paguan partnerin në Shqipëri si pjesë e kostos së saj bruto në përputhje me marrëveshjen,” përfundoi ai…
Es ist unheimlich, wie offen hier über das Aushebeln von Demokratie und Meinungsfreiheit in verstörend freudiger Weise gesprochen wird. Und noch schlimmer ist, dass sich die Menschen das bieten lassen.
15. Juni 2018 um 14:07 Uhr | Verantwortlich: Albrecht Müller
Nur noch Hetze und Feindbildaufbau. Westliche Medienmacher merken schon nicht mehr, wie sehr ihre tägliche Manipulation ihrem freiheitlichen Anspruch widerspricht. Und wie wirklichkeitsfremd ihr Anspruch ist.
Veröffentlicht in: Erosion der Demokratie, Kampagnen / Tarnworte / Neusprech, Medienkritik
Zwei Beispiele und Belege dafür: erstens ein Auszug aus dem heutigen Handelsblatt-Morning-Briefing des Chefredakteurs des Blattes und zweitens der Titel des „Spiegel“ dieser Woche mit einem Einführungstext des stellvertretenden Chefredakteurs des Spiegel. Albrecht Müller.
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